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A Process of Endogenous Deception 
Alexis Stenfors
Abstract:  
This paper uses the Keynesian Beauty Contest as a theoretical framework to analyse the 
London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) fixing mechanism, where the actual money market 
rate is seen as a fundamental value towards which the LIBOR should aim. By treating the 
LIBOR as the outcome of a particular kind of p-beauty contest game, in which players 
(LIBOR banks) are guided by higher order beliefs, a process is created whereby they are not 
solely dependent on their own incentives and constraints. Instead, potential deception is 
generated endogenously though the fixing process itself, resulting in systematic deviations of 
the LIBOR from its fundamental value.  
1 Introduction 
Until around 2008, the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) was widely perceived to be 
a reliable reflection of the interbank money market colloquially and professionally in the 
economic literature. Academics treated the terms as if they were synonyms. Policy makers 
acted as if the LIBOR was an objective reflection of the money market rate. Corporates and 
households entered into LIBOR-indexed financial contacts as if the money market was the 
underlying benchmark. Recently, however, claims that the benchmark, at times, has been 
subject to attempts of manipulation by LIBOR panel banks, have placed this into question. 
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LIBOR-indexed derivatives portfolios and the stigma attached to signalling a relatively high 
funding cost to the rest of the market appears to have given some banks sufficiently strong 
incentives to submit deceptive LIBOR quotes in order to reap monetary benefits from 
having the privilege to participate in the LIBOR fixing process (Financial Services Agency, 
2011; Financial Services Authority, 2012; U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 
2012).  
The LIBOR fixing mechanism lacks binding rules requiring banks to trade at their 
submitted quotes, and is in fact not a market per se. Instead, the benchmark is determined by 
a selected group of panel banks as follows. 1 A designated calculation agent (such as Reuters) 
collects submitted quotes from the individual panel banks before noon. The trader or another 
bank person at the cash desk or treasury submits his or her quote from the bank terminal, and 
the other banks do the same without being able to see each others quotes. The calculation 
agent audits and checks the quotes for obvious errors and then conducts the trimming, 
omitting the highest and lowest quotes (the number of which will depend on the sample size). 
Finally, the arithmetic mean is calculated, rounded to the specified number of decimals and 
published at a specific time depending on the benchmark (British Bankers Association, 
2012). 
The fact that LIBOR panel banks not only have the means and opportunity, but also 
the incentive, to submit deceptive quotes, is of course not exclusively an issue confined to 
legal scholars. In theory, the LIBOR should reflect current and expected future policy rates, 
credit and liquidity risk. The assumption, or rather false perception, that the LIBOR itself is 
based upon actual market transactions is in fact central to previous attempts to decompose the 
LIBOR and money market risk premia such as LIBOR-OIS spreads (See, for example: Bank 
of England, 2007; McAndrews, Sarkar, & Wang, 2008; Poskitt, 2011; Schwartz, 2010).2  This 
approach assumes that the LIBOR rate is objective in the sense that it perfectly reflects where 
the panel banks are able to raise funds from each other, i.e. the money market rate. 
Problematically, the method is not robust should the LIBOR for one reason or the other not 
equal this money market rate. Moreover, should the by far most frequently used benchmark 
for the interbank money market be systematically manipulated, it would have far-reaching 
1 The LIBOR is used broadly in this article also to capture other LIBOR-equivalent benchmarks with similar 
fixing mechanisms, such as the Euro Interbank Offered Rate (EURIBOR), the Norwegian Interbank Offered 
Rate (NIBOR), the Stockholm Interbank Offered Rate (STIBOR) and the Tokyo Interbank Offered Rate 
(TIBOR).
2 OIS refers to the Overnight Index Swap 
3 
consequences for financial markets and policy makers alike. Therefore, greater insight into 
how the LIBOR fixing mechanism works theoretically is essential in political economy.  
Stenfors (2012) adopts a game-theoretical approach to illustrate how the LIBOR 
fixing, at a given time, can be driven by different incentives and constraints of the individual 
LIBOR panel banks. By constructing and solving simple LIBOR games, it is shown that the 
trimming process associated with the LIBOR fixing mechanism is not effective in ensuring a 
fair LIBOR fixing. An endowment in the form of a LIBOR-indexed derivatives portfolio, or 
the stigma attached to signalling high funding costs relative to others, can act as incentives to 
submit LIBOR quotes deviating what could be regarded as the actual money market rate. 
Different forms of collusion can be a possible but not exclusive reason for an off-market 
LIBOR rate if panel banks do not know each others endowments, but rather assume that all 
banks always aim to opt for the best possible strategy to use its ability to influence the 
LIBOR fixing. Significantly, constraints put in place to make the mechanism more market-
like are shown to require full transparency to be effective.  
This article extends the game-theoretical analysis of the LIBOR fixing mechanism. 
Instead of treating it as a single-period game with equally creditworthy players, it emphasises 
the fact that LIBOR submissions are made daily and that the perceived creditworthiness of 
banks might differ. In doing so, it considers whether the deviation between the LIBOR and 
the rate it fundamentally should reflect can be systematic. This is important as any future 
modification in the way the benchmark is determined ultimately needs to consider its simple 
and original purpose: namely to represent the average interbank money market rate. 
Keynesian Beauty Contests in general, and p-beauty contest games in particular, have 
often been used to illustrate why stock markets are volatile and how the price of a tradable 
asset systematically can deviate what objectively could be regarded as its fundamental value. 
From this perspective, we could also consider if some kind of fundamental value exists in the 
money market, and if and why the money market rate at times deviates from this value. The 
LIBOR, in this context, should be seen as a reflection of the money market rate, and not vice 
versa.  
Using the Keynesian Beauty Contest framework, this article conceptualises the money 
market as a kind of fundamental value against which the LIBOR should be benchmarked. 
The LIBOR rate is supposed to be an objective reflection of the interbank money market rate, 
and more specifically the average subjectively reported funding cost of a group of banks. 
This reporting mechanism is viewed in terms of a  LIBOR game, being played an infinite 
number of times, and consisting of players guided by the anticipation of what others will do 
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and what they anticipate others will do. By regarding the LIBOR fixing as the outcome of a 
peculiar form of a p-beauty contest game, a situation is demonstrated where the LIBOR 
deviates from this money market rate. In fact, a p-beauty contest game is precisely how we 
could view the LIBOR Game.3
The results presented in this article show that as players are guided by higher order 
beliefs, some LIBOR panel banks can be seen as being driven towards a behavioural pattern 
that is not dependent on their own incentives and constraints in the first instance, but 
generated endogenously though the process itself. Deception in this case does not need to 
result from the self-interest of an individual LIBOR submitter, but rather from the perception 
that others will act in such a manner that not submitting deceptive LIBOR quotes would be 
punished. This can result in long-lasting deviations of the LIBOR from the underlying money 
market. The current LIBOR fixing mechanism can be seen as a facilitator of such behaviour. 
This article is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of p-beauty 
contest games in the literature, and a discussion on how the LIBOR could conceptually fit 
into this context. In Section 3, a simple LIBOR p-beauty contest game is constructed with the 
aim of being as realistic as possible. Given the utility function of each player (LIBOR panel 
bank), possible outcomes of this game are then considered in Section 4. Section 5 draws 
conclusions. 
2 The p-Beauty Contest Game: Regarding the Money Market as the ‘Fundamental 
Value’ 
Professional investment may be likened to those newspaper competitions in which the 
competitors have to pick out the six prettiest faces from a hundred photographs, the prize 
being awarded to the competitor whose choice most nearly corresponds to the average 
preferences of the competitors as a whole: so that each competitor has to pick, not those 
faces which he himself finds prettiest, but those which he thinks likeliest to catch the 
fancy of the other competitors, all of whom are looking at the problem from the same 
point of view. It is not a case of choosing those which, to the best of ones judgement, are 
3 Inspiration for the design of the LIBOR Game as p-beauty contest game has, in part, been drawn from 
numerous discussions and interviews with market participants during 2007-12. In total, individuals, representing 
15 banks and 4 interdealer brokers, either directly or very closely involved in the LIBOR, TIBOR, NIBOR and 
STIBOR fixing process were consulted. 
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really the prettiest, nor even those which average opinion genuinely thinks the prettiest. 
We have reached the third degree where we devote our intelligences to anticipating what 
average opinion expects the average opinion to be. And there are some, I believe, who 
practise the fourth, fifth and higher degrees. (Keynes, 1936: p. 156) 
This passage from Keynes has provided the basic platform for numerous and different 
variants of games labelled as Keynesian Beauty Contest games. In essence, we are in dealing 
with the phenomenon of market participants not always simply seeking a long-term 
fundamental value of an asset, but taking a more short-term view and incorporating what s/he 
believes others will do and how they believe others will do and so on.  
Although some of the games modelled with this passage in mind might lack direct 
connotations to Keynes (Fung, 2006; Lanteri & Carabelli, 2011), we are nonetheless 
concerned with the observation that the price of a financial asset often deviates from the 
consensus view of the fundamental value of the asset in question. Moreover, the price 
reaction to changes in fundamentals in a beauty contest is much more sluggish than that of 
the consensus fundamental value (Allen, Morris & Shin, 2006). To put it differently, game-
theory is used to understand and illustrate the role of higher-order beliefs in asset pricing as 
each market participant has the ability to affect the market price, and s/he knows that the 
others do as well.  
A typical illustration of a p-beauty contest game is when a large number of players 
simultaneously shall choose a number from a closed interval [0,100]. The person who 
chooses the number closest to p times the mean wins a prize. In case there is a draw, the prize 
is divided equally amongst the winners. To explain the process in a classic p-beauty contest 
game, p is normally set at 2/3. Assuming the guesses are normally distributed between 0 and 
100, the rational guess would there be two-thirds of 50, i.e. 33. But since others think the 
same, it would be 22 (two-thirds of 33), and so on. Hence, for 0 £ p < 1 there is only one 
Nash equilibrium, namely zero (See, for example: Duffy and Nagel, 1997; Ho, Camerer & 
Weigelt, 1998; Nagel, 1995, 1999; Nagel et al., 2002).  
In terms of a Keynesian Beauty Contest, the LIBOR, as a benchmark, should reflect 
the money market  and not vice versa. Conceptually then, we could treat the money market 
rate (whether perfectly observable or not) as a kind of fundamental value, or a focal point, 
towards which the LIBOR rate should aim. More specifically, the LIBOR fixing mechanism 
can be viewed as a p-beauty contest game with more than two players where p = 1.  
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To illustrate this, let us assume that the money market rate is common knowledge and 
that all banks face the same funding cost. Banks in such a game would be driven by a desire 
to guess exactly the average of all guesses. Theoretically, we have a coordination game with 
infinitively many equilibrium points in which all players choose the same number (Ochs, 
1995). However, in a LIBOR game, we do have a natural focal point: the money market rate, 
which in this case is common knowledge.  Therefore, the money market rate could be 
regarded as the fundamental value, i.e. p = 1.  
The trimming process (the omission of the highest and lowest quotes from the 
calculation of the LIBOR fixing) can be seen as a mechanism put in place to ensure that 
players remain alert and aim for p = 1 in every round of the game. Therefore, as players tend 
to avoid extreme endpoints (Rubinstein et al., 1997), and also learn from the LIBOR fixing of 
the previous day, outliers will increase their efforts not to be omitted the following day. Thus, 
the original design of the LIBOR fixing mechanism could be seen as a median-effort-game 
(Cachon & Camerer, 1996), where it is assumed that LIBOR panel banks harmonise their 
behaviour following a learning process.  
However, recent investigations into the alleged LIBOR manipulation have highlighted 
some underlying incentives that might distort this coordination process. For instance, banks 
might have LIBOR-based derivatives portfolios giving them sufficiently strong incentives to 
submit LIBOR quotes deviating from their actual short-term funding cost. From the 
perspective of a p-beauty contest game, these portfolios could be seen as endowments 
automatically forming three different types of players. Players with endowments benefitting 
from a relatively low LIBOR are playing a game where they should guess 0 < p < 1, whereas 
those benefitting from a relatively high LIBOR face a game where p > 1. A player with no 
endowment would continue to play p = 1. As a consequence, if some players face a game 
where p ¹ 1, the probability increases that the LIBOR deviates from the actual money market 
rate, as players have different focal points depending on their underlying LIBOR-indexed 
derivatives portfolios. This game could have different outcomes depending on the distribution 
of the types of players.   
Another incentive relates to the stigma attached to signalling a relative high short-
term funding cost through the LIBOR fixing process. According to the British Bankers 
Association (2012), LIBOR quotes are supposed to reflect where the bank can fund itself in 
the interbank market. Therefore, an individual quote above the average of the panel quotes 
might be interpreted as a signal that the bank has funding problems relative to the others. 
Likewise, a lower than average quote would signal that the bank is in relatively good shape  
7 
as individually submitted LIBOR quotes are visible to the whole market, not only to the other 
LIBOR panel banks after the fixing has taken place. The stigma incentive, thus, rewards 
players submitting a below-average quote  regardless of the actual LIBOR fixing. In terms 
of a p-beauty contest game, the stigma incentive seen in isolation automatically implies that 0 
< p < 1 for all players, rather than p = 1.  
However, despite the existence of these incentives, it is unlikely that players in the 
LIBOR p-beauty contest game (or LIBOR panel banks in reality for that matter) always aim 
to win the game at any cost. The LIBOR (in terms of a game) would not have established 
itself as such an important benchmark without having some kind of constraints attributed to 
it. For instance, the frequent use of fixed intervals in p-beauty contest games is not without 
controversy, as it could be argued that the price drift of a financial asset often lacks typical 
boundaries. To some degree, the same could be said about the LIBOR, which has 
experienced some sharp moves during times of crisis. Nonetheless, the boundaries are hardly 
infinite, and some kind of fixed range of numbers or a tolerated-LIBOR-range probably exists 
theoretically. It could, for instance, be argued that a zero-lower-bound of nominal interest 
rates could be applied to the LIBOR as well (although this could change should the central 
bank in question decide to lower the policy rate well below zero). The upper bound might be 
high as the LIBOR should reflect any liquidity and credit strains in the banking system. 
However, it still ought to correspond to some kind of worst-case-scenario where the central 
bank is perceived to be forced to step in by intervening in the money markets. After all, at 
some LIBOR-level, banks become insolvent and should be removed from the fixing panel in 
question. 
Another special feature of the LIBOR fixing mechanism is the trimming process. To 
some degree, this process could be said to mitigate some of the distortions derived from the 
incentives, thereby ensuring that a sufficient majority of the players stick to p = 1. This, 
however, requires that the stigma incentive applies only to a small minority of the players, 
and that the endowments are perfectly offsetting and normally distributed among them.4
Players in a p-beauty contest game could also be obliged to pay a fine whose size is 
determined by how far the chosen number deviates from the best guess (Güth, Kocher & 
Sutter, 2001). In this context, we could see how the LIBOR fixing mechanism could consist 
of formal, or informal, reputational fines or constraints facing all players. Such a mechanism 
would be put in place to prevent players from submitting deceptive LIBOR quotes, and 
4 In fact, during the era of the Japan Premium, Japanese banks were consistently outliers in the LIBOR fixing 
process. 
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thereby giving them an incentive to adhere to fair play. From a banks perspective, the 
constraint could be interpreted as follows: submitting a deceptive quote might, if discovered, 
result in less client business, legal costs of being under regulatory investigation or even the 
risk of being excluded from the panel altogether and being replaced by another bank. The 
constraint could also be interpreted as affecting only the trading desk or treasury, if they were 
required to commit to their quotes in reasonable-market-size, where a deceptive quote would 
be exploited by other LIBOR panel banks. 
Another variant of the classic p-beauty contest game would be to rank the individual 
players according to how good they are perceived to be at the game (with their rankings being 
common knowledge). Players would then receive a fine if they, on average, manage to outwit 
higher ranked players (in other words, choose a number that is lower than the average of the 
numbers guessed by the players ranked above her/him). The aim with this constraint would 
be to prevent the audience from distrusting the credibility and integrity of the game.  
Although the outcome would be the same (in the case of p = 2/3), the process towards the 
only Nash equilibrium, namely zero, would be slower.  
Whichever type of p-beauty contest game is modelled, within each specific game, 
players need to anticipate what the others will do and what they will anticipate others will do 
and so on. Using these particular features as our point of reference, we will now design a 
LIBOR p-beauty contest game. 
3 Rules of the LIBOR p-Beauty Contest Game 
To analyse the potential outcomes of the LIBOR p-Beauty Contest Game, we will first 
consider a hypothetical game with 16 players (LIBOR panel banks) played from t-1 to 
infinity. 
The LIBOR fixing procedure is as follows. A calculation agent collects the submitted 
quotes from the 16 individual panel banks before noon. The individual LIBOR submissions 
are done simultaneously without the ability to see each others quotes. The calculation agent 
then conducts the trimming process, with omission of the 4 highest and 4 lowest quotes. 
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Thereafter, the arithmetic mean is calculated of the eight remaining LIBOR submissions. Let 
us assume that all 16 banks face the same (largely known) funding cost (M) in the first round 
(at t-1) as they are perceived to be equally creditworthy and have similar access to liquidity. 
Further, the banks have no LIBOR-indexed derivatives portfolios acting as incentives to 
distort the fixing process.   
Let us also assume that each player is only allowed to adjust their quotes by 
increments of 10 basis points (0.10%). Furthermore, the tolerable LIBOR range is [0.00%, 
2.00%]. These are not necessary conditions but useful for the sake of simplicity and clarity of 
argument. 
From these assumptions, it is obvious that M is the clear focal point in this game and 
that all banks submit LIBOR quotes at, or close to, the funding cost at the time (assumed to 
be, say, 1.00%). In any case, outliers are omitted through the trimming process and the 
LIBOR fixing will end up close to 1.00% at t-1. This corresponds to the p-beauty contest 
game where p = 1. 
If p = 1 for all players, the money market rate can be seen as the natural focal point or 
fundamental value towards which the LIBOR should drift. However, let us now introduce 
some new variables that capture a more realistic scenario. To be more specific, let four 
significant changes take place at t0, having an impact on the incentives structures and beliefs 
of the players without altering the LIBOR fixing mechanism itself.  
First, some players have an endowment (E), which is private knowledge and where E+ 
> 0, E0 = 0 and E- < 0. The endowment is a derivatives portfolio benchmarked against the 
LIBOR. For the sake of argument, let us simply assume that a player with a positive 
endowment (E+) benefits from a high LIBOR, players with a negative endowment (E-) from a 
low LIBOR and players with no endowment (E0) are indifferent. Whereas the players know 
their own ps, they are not aware of the distribution of the ps among the others, as the 
endowment is private knowledge. Consequently, the payoff from the endowment in each 
round depends on the sign and size of the endowment, as well as the change in the LIBOR 
fixing (LF): 
  	
,                                             (1) 
where 	
  
  
 . Thus, each player has an incentive to submit a quote that maximises 
the expected change in value of the endowment from t-1 to t.  
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In terms of a p-beauty contest game, this could now be seen as a game where we have 
three types of players not knowing what type the others are nor the distribution among them. 
Player type 1 (in other words E-) shall guess p times the mean where p = 2/3, player type 2 
(E0) shall guess p times the mean where p = 1 and player type 3 (E+) where p = 4/3. The 
strategy of each player will simply depend on the sign of the endowment in each round.   
Second, a stigma is imposed on submitting a relatively high LIBOR. This is directly 
caused by a credit crisis leading to a wider distribution of the perceived creditworthiness of 
the players (banks) by the market. Let us assume that the crisis has resulted in an increase in 
the average short-term bank funding cost from 1.00% to 2.00%. Specifically, we will assume 
that the OIS price is unchanged implying that the increase in the short-term funding cost is 
purely a reflection of increased credit and liquidity strains in the money market. Moreover, 
increased market uncertainly and volatility allows for larger day-to-day moves in LIBOR 
quotes (0.20% instead of 0.10%), as well as a wider tolerable LIBOR range [0.00%, 4.00%]. 
Despite the importance of the LIBOR as a benchmark, however, other indicators such 
as credit ratings or credit default swaps (CDSs) matter also. Put differently, the wider 
distribution of the perceived creditworthiness at t0 calls for the introduction of an independent 
and objective referee as well as an internal ranking system of the players. Let us simply say 
that the referee is the market. The internal ranking system is market-determined in the sense 
that each player is allocated a place hierarchically according to how creditworthy it is 
perceived to be compared to its peers. The perceived creditworthiness of each individual bank 
is assessed by the observable 5-year credit default swap spreads in the market, which prior to 
t0 were identical. Let us now assume that from t0, the CDS spreads are unequally distributed 
between the 16 banks {A, B, C... P}, ranging from 100 bps to 475 bps. BankA (CDS = 100) is 
perceived as the most creditworthy, BankB slightly less (CDS = 125) and so on. BankP is 
regarded as the riskiest with a CDS spread of 475 bps. Let us also assume that the CDS 
spreads remain constant throughout the game. 
As a result, the bank funding cost is now partly dependent on the long-term funding 
cost (the CDS price which is public knowledge) and the short-term funding cost (which is 
private knowledge only but subjectively communicated through the LIBOR submission). 
Thus, each bank now not only wants to maximise the value of its LIBOR-indexed derivatives 
portfolio but also wants to minimise the stigma () attached to having a relatively high 
funding cost.  
In terms of a p-beauty contest game, some players now have conflicting objectives. 
On the one hand, they are playing a game where p = 2/3, p = 1 or p = 4/3 (depending on their 
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endowment). On the other hand, all players now simultaneously play the same game where p
< 0, as they would prefer to signal to the market that their short-term funding cost is slightly 
lower than their peers. 
The payoff from the stigma can be written as: 
  		,                                 (2) 
where  and  are constants. The RHS of the equation consists of two parts: the stigma 
derived from the long-term funding cost, and the stigma from the short-term funding cost (the 
LIBOR). The long-term funding cost is exogenously determined and market-observable 
(proxied by the CDS spread). The payoff from this stigma (LT) cannot be influenced by the 
players actions as it is market-determined: 
	    å      å                              (3) 
However, the stigma derived from the short-term funding cost (ST) is endogenously
derived from the LIBOR fixing mechanism which the player has influence over. Here, the 
individual banks can (and wish to) minimise the bank funding cost as it is perceived to be by 
the market: 
	  
  å    
  å                               (4) 
Now, although the individual LIBOR quotes are subjective and their accuracy 
therefore cannot be verified, it would be unrealistic to assume that the banks perceived as the 
least creditworthy (judging by their long-term CDS spreads) have the ability to raise short-
term funding more easily than their peers. Importantly, the market is not indifferent, and 
would not find it credible should the individual LIBOR quotes not correspond to at least 
some kind of ordering from the most creditworthy to the least creditworthy. In other words, 
this calls for the introduction of an credibility constraint, where each player is subject to a 
fine (denoted ) should they signal a relatively too low funding cost, as the market (which 
is aware of the CDS-spreads) would not regard it as credible if a bank claimed its short-term 
funding cost to be lower than those with lower CDS spreads: 
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  ,                                  (5) 
Finally, it is likely that players in the LIBOR game are bound by some rules or 
constraints that relate to their reputation. This is to protect third-party actors with exposure to 
the LIBOR from being affected by potential incentives which individual banks might have to 
abuse the system and submit either too high - or too low - quotes. This reputational- 
constraint could take different forms: as a requirement among the banks to trade a certain 
amount at the submitted LIBOR quote, as a requirement by regulators to occasionally 
disclose underlying traders forming the judgement basis for the quote, or simply as a pre-
agreed Gentlemens agreement among the panel banks to adhere to fair play. In each 
instance, players could be seen as being subject to a reputational fine (expressed as ) of 
how much their LIBOR quotes deviate from the mean of the others: 
  
  å                                   (6) 
In sum, the new payoff function for each player can be written as follows: 
  	
  		  ,   
  å                          (7) 
4 Outcome: A Process of Endogenous Deception 
Before analysing the potential outcomes of this game, let us first recap the LIBOR fixing at t-
1, which was 1.00%. The credit crisis then resulted in an increase in the average short-term 
funding cost by 1.00%. Following the new restriction of only being allowed to move in 
0.20% increments in each round, the market should expect a LIBOR fixing at 1.20% at t0,
1.40% at t1 and finally 2.00% at t4, as each player gradually submits a higher LIBOR quote. 
Since the average short-term funding cost now is 2.00%, which could be regarded as the 
fundamental value of M, we should theoretically expect this to be reflected in the LIBOR 
fixing as time progresses. However, the new game now also more closely resembles that of 
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the real LIBOR fixing mechanism, and new incentives and constraints apply. This implies a 
totally different outcome.   
First, the endowments changed the dynamics of the game. As LIBOR banks are now 
given incentives to submit deceptive quotes, the quotes will now be more widely dispersed. 
Players with small or no endowments at all (E » 0) have no incentive to submit deceptive 
quotes, and will therefore, on average, increase their quotes towards the expected 2.00%. 
However, a player with E- would choose to submit 0.80% and a player with E+ 1.20% in the 
first round. What is more, they would gradually move towards the respective extreme points 
of the tolerated range (0.00% and 4.00% respectively). Some quotes would naturally be 
omitted through the fixing process. Nonetheless, the outcome after a number of rounds have 
been played will depend on the distribution of the endowments, and in this case also the 
learning process that follows from the signalling in each round.  
Second, the reputational constraint (expressed as ) works as a hindrance to submit 
overly deceptive quotes, as the fine takes into account the size of the deviation from the 
average quotes. At the outset, the LIBOR should drift towards 2.00% in a few days as the 
average funding cost (which is public knowledge) has increased substantially. This 
knowledge should make players with E+ more comfortable in raising their quotes than players 
with E- in lowering their quotes. However, the reputational constraint prevents any player 
from adjusting her/his quote by a large increment as this could result in a reputational fine. 
Should the groups with E+ and E- be equally distributed, the LIBOR would have a tendency 
to move (albeit slowly) higher. Likewise, should the E/-ratio increase, players with large 
endowments would have the incentive to change their quote slightly more in their favour as 
the relatively small fine of being an outlier is outweighed by the possibility that others think 
and do the same.  
Importantly, players with E » 0 cannot be safely assured that a fair quote or even a 
quote in a fairer direction will be left unpunished. The reputational cost occurs regardless of 
whether the player has an endowment or not, and imitating the crowd will consequently be 
necessary to avoid potential losses stemming from being an outlier. In fact, the mere 
expectation that players in a large sub-group (say with E-) will shift their quotes in one 
direction will prompt players with E0 to do the same, as they would (possibly unfairly) 
otherwise face a penalty from deviating from the mean. Thus, at this stage the game can be 
seen as a situation where incentives are balanced against the constraint of having to imitate 
the crowd.  
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Third, the stigma of signalling a relatively low creditworthiness prevents players from 
submitting high quotes. Now, since t0, the individual bank funding costs are diverse. This in 
itself should imply LIBOR quotes scattered around 2.00% after a few days as the market 
expects the LIBOR to trend toward its fundamental value. In fact, judging by the observable 
CDS spreads, the market should expect some kind of ordering of the LIBOR quotes from the 
best banks quotes well below 2% and the worst banks significantly above 2%. The 
trimming mechanism should ensure that the extreme outliers are omitted (those hardly 
affected by the crisis and those facing severe trouble). From the players perspective, 
however, the worsening perceived long-term, as well as the short-term, funding cost has a 
direct negative impact. In this game, the long-term funding cost is exogenously determined, 
expressed by the CDS market. However, whereas the measure for the long-term funding cost 
is public knowledge, the short-term funding cost lacks transparency. Instead, players are 
assessed according to their own assessments announced through their respective LIBOR 
submissions. In both instances players are rewarded (or penalised) according to how they 
compare against their peers. Thus, all banks now have an incentive to submit relatively low 
LIBOR quotes to distance themselves from the others.  
Fourth, leaving the endowments aside for a moment, the credibility constraint () 
prevents all banks apart from BankA to submit a relatively low quote at t0, as they would 
automatically face a penalty not only from deviating from the others (the reputational 
constraint), but also from having submitted a non-credible quote (the credibility constraint). 
The market or the wider public, comparing the CDS spreads between the players, would not 
believe that the players own assessment of its credit and liquidity standing is correct. If the 
reputational fine is small, but not non-existent, and the potential stigma payoff large, BankA
would have an incentive to signal to the market that its short-term funding cost indeed is 
much lower than that of its peers (by submitting, say, 0.90%). At t1, with the results from the 
previous round now taken into account within respective strategy decisions, BankB can safely 
quote 0.90%, whereby BankA has the opportunity to lower its quote a step further (to 0.80%) 
in order to distinguish itself even further from the its creditworthy peers . At t2, it is BankCs 
turn to quote 0.90%, whereas BankA and BankB yet again opt to distance themselves further 
from the less creditworthy banks. Seen in isolation, this process would continue until the 
Nash equilibrium of 0.00% is reached. However - and here is the essence of the p-beauty 
contest game - banks anticipate that the others will move. BankB can therefore safely quote, 
say, 0.95% already at t0, as s/he knows that the best strategy of BankA is to quote 0.90% (as 
s/he is also aware of the CDS spread of the other banks). Likewise, BankC anticipates that 
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BankB anticipates that BankA will quote 0.90% and can therefore also lower its quote slightly 
 and so on. Now, BankA, in the first place, also anticipates that others anticipate her/his 
initial move and therefore takes this into already with her/his first move. 
The original design of the LIBOR fixing mechanism (where p = 1) implies that the 
average funding cost is 2.00% and that the LIBOR fixing should not trend lower but higher 
towards this fundamental value. The LIBOR p-beauty contest game presented here, however, 
illustrates that even though the LIBOR should trend towards 2.00%, this process can be very 
slow or not happen at all. In fact, the game shows that the opposite can occur. This game is 
about imitating the crowd but at the same time trying to outsmart it slightly, with the 
knowledge that others will do the same. The combination of different incentives and 
constraints, and the anticipation of what others will do, results in a slow process towards an 
equilibrium not necessarily equalling the expected average funding cost of the panel banks. 
Throughout this process, LIBOR quotes can be narrowly distributed which might not be 
justified by the distribution of perceived creditworthiness among the panel banks. 
Banks with strong incentives from the endowment or the stigma to submit deceptive 
quotes can be better off doing so in this game. However, even players seemingly without 
such incentives get caught up in this process. For instance, players with a bank funding cost 
precisely equalling the average of 2% can be penalised from not only finding themselves as 
unexpected outliers, but being required to signal a slightly higher creditworthiness than 
actually assessed internally. Likewise, players with negligible or no endowments at all can 
become less focused on the fundamental money market rate than the anticipated LIBOR-rate. 
In sum, even for the seemingly average and fair player, the LIBOR p-beauty contest game 
becomes a loss-making process when not following the crowd. Therefore, deception can be 
seen as a problem not specific to the behaviour of individual players, but systematic and 
endogenous to the LIBOR fixing process itself. 
5 Concluding Discussion 
By regarding the LIBOR fixing as the outcome of a unusual form of a p-beauty contest game, 
this  article has illustrated how the LIBOR can deviate systematically from what could be 
regarded as its fundamental value, namely the consensus view of where the average money 
market funding cost is. The trimming process has often been regarded as an effective 
prevention method against systematic manipulation. 5 This assumes either that artificially low 
5 Gyntelberg & Wooldbridge (2008), for instance, acknowledge that LIBOR panel banks, in theory, could act 
strategically in their fixing but that the trimming process acts as a hindering factor. 
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and high quotes are normally distributed, or that a LIBOR panel bank knows that a deceptive 
quote will be omitted from the calculation and therefore will be ineffective. However, the 
outcomes of the p-beauty contest game do not support these arguments. Moreover, a typical 
LIBOR panel composition is probably not heterogeneous but fairly homogenous at the outset. 
A common feature of all LIBOR panels is that they largely consist of universal too-big-to-fail 
banks that are highly active (and normally market-makers) in the money, foreign exchange 
and derivatives markets. As the recent global financial crisis has shown, the distribution of 
their asset and liabilities is not randomly distributed but fairly similar.  
LIBOR-indexed derivatives portfolios can act as incentives to submit deceptive 
quotes. What is more, there is nothing preventing LIBOR banks from increasing or 
decreasing their own exposure to the benchmark they themselves can influence. 
Systematically favourable LIBOR fixings give the incentive to keep or increase the exposures 
while unfavourable fixings give incentive to reduce them.  
In the LIBOR p-beauty contest game presented in this article, it would obviously pay 
for some players to collude through communication, should it be possible. For instance, a 
group of banks with identical endowments might want to mutually agree to opt for the same 
strategy to maximise the expected payoff, and consequently also share the reputational fine. 
Moreover, communication and signalling becomes endogenous to the LIBOR p-beauty 
contest game as it is played five business days a week and more than 200 times a year. 
Collusion might lead to quicker and more certain outcomes. However, a non-cooperative 
LIBOR game can lead to the same results; although their conception of the solution is 
totally different (Schelling, 1980: pp. 94-95). 
However, seen in isolation, the stigma attached to signalling a relatively high funding 
cost works against collusion as individual banks are judged individually compared to their 
peers. This is perhaps the single most important explanation why anecdotal evidence 
throughout the global financial crisis, as well as the recent investigations into the conduct of a 
number of LIBOR panel banks, has suggested that the LIBOR consistently has been too low. 
The results are therefore consistent with empirical studies suggesting underreporting of the 
LIBOR by panel banks (Abrantes-Metz et al., 2011; Monticini & Thornton, 2013; Snider & 
Youle 2009, 2010).  
The LIBOR p-beauty contest game modelled in this article highlights another feature 
of the stigma: its relation to other financial indicators. If the long-term funding cost of a 
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particular bank is observable through some market-determined process (such as the CDS 
market), whereas the short-term funding cost is a kind of self-assessment (the LIBOR), the 
former can act as a variable that influences the LIBOR panel banks to submit deceptive 
quotes. This fundamental problem is highlighted through the credibility constraint in the 
game. It could be argued that the individual quotes by the LIBOR panel banks should be 
ranked according to their perceived creditworthiness in the market, for instance by their 
respective CDS-spreads. Even though no such ranking systems officially exist, the 
continuous market assessment of long-term creditworthiness, and the LIBOR banks 
awareness of it, induces a process whereby banks want to look good, but not too good. The 
credibility constraint in the LIBOR p-beauty contest game therefore shows that even though 
players at times might be ordered correctly, the distance between them depends on the other 
features of the game. In fact, the results show how the LIBOR can have a tendency to observe 
a certain stickiness, and how the different LIBOR quotes among the panel banks can be 
more narrowly distributed than would be suggested by other financial indicators.6 As such, it 
might give the false impression that the money market is stable and  banks have fairly similar 
funding costs. Finally, the reputational constraint appears as an incentive not to submit a 
LIBOR quote that deviates too much from the others. A possible and striking outcome of this 
is the inability of fair players, with small endowments or an average funding cost level, to 
determine the outcome of the game despite their natural desire to harmonise their quotes 
around the fundamental rate. Deception can become endogenous to the LIBOR fixing 
process, and not deceiving is punished in a similar way as to paying above market for a 
distraught asset. Consequently, as players are guided by higher order beliefs, some LIBOR 
panel banks can be seen as being driven towards a behavioural pattern that is not dependent 
on their own incentives and constraints in the first instance, but generated endogenously
though the process itself. Deception in this case does not need to result from the self-interest 
of an individual LIBOR submitter, but from the perception that others will act in such a 
manner that not submitting deceptive LIBOR quotes would be punished. The privilege to be 
able to influence the LIBOR rests with the LIBOR panel banks. This exclusive right gives 
rise to significant power, which in turn becomes reinforced as manipulation (whether 
conscious or unconscious) receives a kind of conventional status.  As such, the current 
LIBOR fixing mechanism is characterized by a fundamental and systematic flaw.  
6 The LIBOR tends to react more slowly to unexpected rate moves, liquidity and credit shocks than the money 
market rate. 
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